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PREFACE
Sieps, the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, con-
ducts and promotes research, evaluations, analyses and studies
of European policy issues, with a focus primarily in the areas of
political science, law and economics.
Sieps has commissioned a number of reports relating to issues
that, in the opinion of Sieps, will be of importance in the up-
coming intergovernmental conference. The reports will be deal-
ing with a range of constitutional, procedural and material
questions. Each report will outline the key principal problems
of the issue area, the work and the proposals of the Convention
and analyse these proposals from clearly stated assumptions or
aims and finally to be firmly grounded in the academic debate.
The reader shall consequently be able to get an overview of the
state of the art as well as a comprehensive introduction to the
issues in question. 
One of the missions of the Institute is to act as a bridge between
academics and policy-makers and one of the primary aims of
these reports is to build this bridge. Furthermore, in a broader
sense the reports shall contribute to increased interest in current
issues in European integration as well as increased debate on
the future of Europe.
Tomas Dahlman
Director
Sieps
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5THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION:
A NEW GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE
FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION? *
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research question
When the European Convention began its work, the open
method of coordination (OMC) was not one of the central
issues. However, open coordination cropped up in different
working groups of the Convention, slowly but steadily. The
working groups on Economic Governance, Simplification,
Complementary Competencies (renamed ‘supporting
measures’), and above all Social Europe have examined open
coordination and formulated proposals. There is no doubt that
the OMC, although initially somewhat neglected by the Con-
vention, will be a key issue in the discussion leading to the next
Inter-Governmental Conference of the European Union. This
report addresses the following questions:
• To what extent (and how) does the open method of coordina-
tion represent a new mode of governance? Where does it come
from? What is the ‘master discourse’ providing political
meaning and direction to the OMC?
• How far can the method go in terms of ‘better governance’? 
• What does empirical evidence tell us? Is the method an effi-
cient way to encourage policy learning? Is open coordination
effective?
• What is the legitimacy of the method?
• What are the main suggestions for improvement?
* I wish to express my gratitude to Caroline de la Porte, who kindly
discussed with me the ‘state of the art’ literature on the subject of this report
and commented on an early draft. I appreciate her time and enjoyed our
discussions. Kerstin Jacobsson kindly sent me a number of perceptive com-
ments and suggestions. I am responsible for all inaccuracies and mistakes.
61.2 Outline
The report illustrates the essential features of the method
(Section 3). It discusses the emergence of the OMC within the
long-term attempt to make Europe more competitive. The so-
called Lisbon agenda is therefore situated in its wider historical
context (Section 4). The report makes a distinction between the
ideal-typical features of open coordination – that is, the rather
abstract template described in the conclusions of the 2000
Lisbon summit (and other official documents) and the reality of
open coordination. Section 5 reaches the conclusion that the
case for the abstract OMC template as new mode of governan-
ce based on learning can be made. However, the potential of the
OMC is constrained by a number of contradictions. According-
ly, Section 6 looks into the issue of endemic tension. The con-
clusion is that open coordination – in its abstract, ideal-typical
form – has considerable potential for ‘better governance’, but
endemic tension limits what it can achieve.
The report then turns to an empirical and comparative analysis
of open coordination across policy areas (Section 7). On the
basis of the existing knowledge of ‘real-world’ OMC processes,
the report raises the issues of policy learning, effectiveness, and
legitimacy (Section 8). Although it is too early to make a de-
finitive assessment of a method devised to reach its goals by the
year 2010, the gap between theoretical inspiration and reality is
wide, especially in terms of learning, participation, overall
coherence, and legitimacy. This is enough to set an agenda for
improvement of the OMC within the context of the new Inter-
Governmental Conference and at the micro level of specific
policy areas. The conclusion (Section 9) is that a number of re-
forms are needed – otherwise open coordination will remain a
discourse but not an effective and legitimate new mode of
governance.
72. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
2.1 Summary
A legitimising discourse
Today, the open method of coordination (OMC) is eminently
a legitimising discourse. It provides a community of policy-
makers with a common vocabulary and a legitimising project –
to make Europe the most competitive knowledge society in
the world. As legitimising discourse, open coordination enables
policy-makers to deal with new tasks in policy areas that are
either politically sensitive or in any case not amenable to the
classic Community method. The result is that practices that up
until a few years ago would have been simply labelled ‘soft law’,
new policy instruments, and benchmarking are now presented
as ‘applications’ if not ‘prototypes’ of ‘the’ method.
One method or several? 
The reality is that the method varies markedly across policy
areas. Accordingly, one should not refer to ‘the’ method but to
different policy practices that take inspiration from the Lisbon
conclusions as legitimising discourse.
If the OMC is the solution, competitiveness is the problem
The OMC is not just a discursive invention, however. Firstly,
there are structural reasons for the appearance of the method in
the EU policy process, most notably the long-term attempt of
European policy-makers to get to grips with the problem of
competitiveness. This report argues that open coordination is
embedded in the master discourse of competitiveness. The lat-
ter limits what is politically feasible in terms of the ‘European
social model’. One should not see the constrained nature of the
OMC in purely negative terms. The constraints provide a cul-
ture of macro-economic stability within which social protection
and employment policies are still feasible. 
Open coordination as abstract template: a better way forward
Secondly, although there are variations in the usage of the OMC,
the latter can be examined as an ideal-type to understand its
8mechanisms and potential. In its ideal-typical form, the OMC
is a new mode of governance. This is due to the main features
of the method, such as participation, the approach to problem-
solving, the ways in which knowledge and learning are created
and diffused across countries. Open coordination may work like
a radar searching for solutions and new usable knowledge.
Some commentators argue that the method searches and
diffuses local knowledge – and in doing so creates the pre-
conditions for bottom-up learning. Other commentators think
that learning is more hierarchical and that open coordination is
a methodology to get Member States in line with the EU policy.
Be that as it may, the OMC in vitro – that is, in its ideal-typical
format – has considerable potential. It can deliver ‘better
governance’. In this sense, it is not a second-best option to hard
legislation. It is a better way forward. The lack of sanctioning
mechanisms is not a problem in a governance architecture
based on incentives for learning.
Endemic tension
Open coordination contains elements of endemic tension, how-
ever. On the one hand, it works on innovation and improvement
on a case-by-case basis. This should keep politicisation at low
levels. On the other, the aim in the OMC is to promote conver-
gence and coordination at the highest political levels, notably at
the European Council. This makes politicisation unavoidable.
Open coordination encourages cooperation and imitation, but
it also promotes diversity and competition. It is a means to
achieve competitiveness, but there are many participants in the
Convention working groups that see open coordination as a way
to balance the economic logic with the values of ‘the European
social model’. Tension and contradictions are an essential com-
ponent of political life. However, they make some of the
grandiose expectations of the OMC architects less realistic than
they seem at first glance. One task for the next Inter-Govern-
mental Conference is to spell out these contradictions and
discuss how they can be resolved.
9From the template to policy practice:
variations around a common theme or different melodies? 
Turning to ‘real-world’ open coordination processes, empirical
evidence is still preliminary. This report reviews the evidence
available in economic policy, employment policy, social in-
clusion, pensions, innovation, and direct taxation. There are
elements of similarity across policy areas. But the devil is in the
details, as ever. Benchmarking, peer-review, and learning mean
different things in different policies. Policy-makers make refe-
rence to the OMC as legitimising discourse, but they deal with
different mechanisms and logics. There are lighter and harder
versions of the method. Most processes are political, but others
are governed by the logic of expertise and bureaucratic goals.
The ideal-typical sequence of ‘guidelines-indicators-national
plans-evaluation’ is subverted in some policies.
Limited results
What has been achieved so far? One disappointing result is that
cross-national and bottom-up learning has been limited. This re-
port argues that the poor results in terms of learning reflect the
lack of bottom-up participation, the under-estimation of the
peculiarities of learning in a political context, and the limita-
tions in the current use of benchmarking.
Ideational convergence
One successful result (yet confirmed only by very preliminary
evidence) is convergence at the level of ideas in some policy
areas (ideational convergence). This means that policy-makers
converge in their assessment of causal mechanisms at work in
policy areas, definitions of desirable and unacceptable policies,
and beliefs about how policies work. This convergence goes be-
yond the superficial convergence on the OMC as legitimising
discourse. However, ideational convergence is still embryonic,
and in some cases fragile. It does not go as far as to produce
convergence in decisions at the domestic level and convergence
in policy implementation. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that
even a ‘perfect’ application of the OMC will result in a more
diverse Europe.
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The issue of overall coordination and policy direction
The method has not achieved much in terms of coordination
across policies. But something has been achieved. The em-
ployment guidelines have been decided jointly by Ecofin and
the Social Affairs and Labour Council. The eleven objectives of
pension policy have been agreed jointly by the Social Protec-
tion Committee and the Economic Policy Committee. The re-
cent initiative to coordinate employment policy and economic
policy should improve on the status quo, but it does not answer
two questions. First, is the European Council the most efficient
venue for policy coordination? Secondly, if policy-makers
still disagree on the ultimate direction of open coordination
(to simplify: social Europe versus the economic logic of com-
petitiveness) how can they coordinate policies successfully? 
2.2 Conclusions
Back to the drawing board? The role of micro-reforms
The potential of open coordination is still there, ready to be
exploited. This leads to the question of how to make better use
of the method. One argument in this report is that a number of
claims about the OMC are exaggerated. Accordingly, the debate
should be more realistic. This is important for the macro-
reforms that will be discussed in the next IGC. But the micro
level should not be ignored. Indeed, the discussion should be
cast in terms of a realistic diagnosis of the instruments and
methodologies policy by policy.
Contextualising the OMC
One problem in the current debate is that open coordination has
been examined in vitro instead that in context. This has three
implications. The first implication is that one should have a
clear idea of when and how the OMC should be used, when
other new modes of governance should be used, or when the
‘old’ Community method is the most appropriate approach. This
is where the proposals arising out of the European Convention
working groups are most useful. The second implication is that
we need to understand and assess the performance of different
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modes of governance interacting within the same policy areas.
Most policies reviewed in this report show that the OMC is used
in conjunction with other modes, but we do not know much
about the overall policy coherence achieved. We do not know
whether various modes of governance reinforce each other or
pull in different directions. The third implication is that the end
result of proposed reforms should not be how to improve the
OMC but how to improve policies by making European and
domestic institutions more intelligent.
The macro level of reforms:
Constitutionalisation of open coordination? 
One way to relate the OMC debate to the whole question of EU
governance is the proposal – which cropped up in different work-
ing groups of the European Convention, such as the ones on
‘Economic governance’, ‘Complementary Competencies’, Sim-
plification’, and above all ‘Social Europe’ – to insert a treaty
article defining the OMC. Some participants in the European
Convention went so far as to argue for a specific reference to the
‘social market economy. A Constitutional article may help in
demarcating the territory of the OMC. It should respect the
flexible and experimental nature of the relation between open
coordination and legislative competence. Accordingly, the Con-
stitution should not restrict open coordination to areas where the
EU does not possess legislative competence. It should define the
process of open coordination in general terms (participation and
transparency as general features of the whole process; guide-
lines, indicators, national plans, peer review, monitoring and
feedback as key steps of the process). It should also state that
open coordination should not be used to attack the aquis (put
differently, constitutional protection of the acquis from possible
degradation via open coordination). Finally, a generic article on
the method should not be applied to the BEPG and the European
Employment Strategy, where there are already specific articles.
Turning to the question of whether the EU Constitution should
make references to the social market economy, it is most unlikely
that the European Convention will subvert the master discourse
of competitiveness in which the OMC is embedded.
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Reforms should go beyond treaty revisions
An inter-institutional agreement clarifying the role of the
European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions is
needed.
So far the method has been managed by the Council and the
Commission without real involvement of other EU institutional
actors. 
Learn how to learn: the importance of lesson-drawing
Arguably, the most effective reforms are those at the level of po-
licies. The room for improvement here is impressive. There is
much to learn from intelligent benchmarking – as opposed to
the a-critical usage of this technique. This report also argues that
benchmarking should not be the only show in town. Methodo-
logies and suggestions for learning from positive and negative
lessons are available, but somewhat neglected in the OMC pro-
cesses reviewed here. The suggestion is to seek a balance be-
tween benchmarking and context-sensitive lesson-drawing.
Political learning
OMC analyses have so far treated learning as if policy-makers
were seeking truth. But learning in a political context is emin-
ently (albeit not exclusively) about power. Indicators, peer re-
views, and reformulation of guidelines produce hierarchies
of models and differential adaptational pressures on Member
States. The under-estimation of learning within a political con-
text explains the poor results achieved so far.
Opening up the OMC
Limited participation is another major cause of poor results.
Peer review and reporting should become more incisive and
more participatory. National plans are provided by governments,
hence they tend to be over-enthusiastic about the current situa-
tion. It is of course essential that national plans are prepared by
governments because this creates political commitment, but
more independent reporting from the Member States would en-
hance both learning and participation. Thus, the method should
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be opened up to the relevant actors for each OMC process. This
could also mean additional reporting (and not just scrutiny)
on specific areas from these actors. One clear lesson from
the current experience is that to increase participation within
the OMC requires a re-orientation of policy processes at the
domestic level. This is not something that can be decided
in Brussels. The institutional architects of the OMC have neg-
lected the issue of how to create a structure of incentives for
participation at the local and national levels. 
The biggest challenge: legitimacy, accountability,
and democratisation of the method
Participation is just one dimension of the whole issue of
accountability, democratisation, and legitimacy of new modes
of governance. Democracy goes much further than deliberation
in technocratic circles. The democratisation of the method is an
extremely complicated exercise. It boils down to an attempt to
change domestic policy practice and policy styles. Account-
ability is not ensured by the fact that the OMC choices are
taken by national leaders. Instead of launching yet another
discussion on the abstract properties of new modes of govern-
ance it would be more useful to take stock of the negative
lessons and re-think about democracy pragmatically. The OMC
has considerable potential for ‘better EU governance’ but the
effort to exploit this potential has just begun.
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3. BACK TO BASICS:
THE PROPERTIES OF THE METHOD
Although policy processes embodying several features of the
OMC emerged throughout the 1990s, the method was establish-
ed by the Lisbon European Council (23–24 March 2000). The
Presidency conclusions preface the discussion of the open
method by stating that ‘no new process is needed’ and that the
European Council ‘will take on a pre-eminent guiding and co-
ordinating role to ensure overall coherence’ (Presidency Con-
clusions, points 35 and 36). There is a bit of a paradox in that a
‘new’ mode of governance was not originally recognised as such
by the summit which launched it. The Council looked at
the OMC as an instrument to be used within the existing
Cardiff, Cologne, and Luxembourg processes. 
The statement on the ‘guiding and coordinating role’ of the
European Council (the reference is to Spring Council, which is
in charge of coordinating the Lisbon strategy) is also somewhat
paradoxical. It is well-known that the European Council is good
at launching new policy ideas and at stitching up political com-
promises, but no-one would have ever thought of the summit as
a suitable forum for policy coordination. As will be argued be-
low, one of the main problems of the OMC is that the overall
level of coordination remains low.
After this paradoxical start, the Lisbon conclusions gain in
clarity by presenting the ‘new open method of coordination’
as a means of spreading best practice and ‘achieving greater
convergence towards the main EU goals’. The method – the
European Council added – is ‘designed to help Member States
to progressively develop their own policies’. The method is not
a means to achieve harmonisation. Member states use it to
develop their own policies and to achieve coordination. Both
‘coordination’ and ‘open’ were not defined at Lisbon. 
One can of course submit that coordination of domestic policies
is needed to achieve EU goals, given certain conditions. Indeed,
Lisbon used the word ‘convergence’ which presupposes more
political determination and stronger end-results (in terms of po-
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licy outcomes) than simple coordination. One problem with this
definition of the method is that EU leaders differ in their de-
finition of these ‘main EU goals’ in politically sensitive areas
such as employment policy, social policy, and tax policy. The
Lisbon conclusions are significantly silent on how these EU
goals should be reached and coordinated across policies. 
Let us carry on with the properties and instruments of the OMC.
Lisbon added that the OMC involves:
• ‘fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific time-
tables for achieving the goals (…) in the short, medium and
long terms;
• establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative
indicators and benchmarks against the best in the world and
tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors
as a means of comparing best practice;
• translating these European guidelines into national and re-
gional policies by setting specific targets;
• periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as
mutual learning processes’ (Presidency Conclusions, point
37).
This provides an illustration of the most complete form of the
method. Although some of its elements such as indicators
should be included only ‘when appropriate’ (note that there is
no clue on how to assess this appropriateness), the ‘method’ in
its most sophisticated form includes the following components:
• Guidelines
• Benchmarking and sharing of best practices
• Multi-lateral surveillance
• Indicators
• Iterative process
• Implementation through domestic policy and legislation (this
means that no EU legislation is needed).
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Before we examine the OMC as new governance architecture,
there are three general remarks to bear in mind. To begin with,
although the OMC academic literature has now become a thri-
ving cottage industry, our empirical knowledge of the OMC at
work in specific policy processes remains limited. Table one in-
dicates that there are almost 80 studies of the OMC reported in
the University of Madison – Wisconsin EU Centre’s ‘Forum on
the open method’1. However, the vast majority deal with the
general features of the method and with employment policy. It
is simply too early to make bold assessments of the method as
‘new mode of governance’ – especially in areas different from
employment policy. Further, Lisbon set goals for the year 2010,
so one should not rush assessments before the deadline is at
least in sight. 
Table 1 – Texts (that is, articles, book chapters,
conference papers, unpublished papers) on the open
method of coordination listed in the ‘OMC forum’
website of the University of Wisconsin, Madison
General 29
Employment 29
Social inclusion 9
BEPG – macroeconomic policy – Cardiff process 5
Immigration 1
Education 1
European research area 1
Environmental policy 1
Taxation 1
Source: our calculation based on the list published by the EU Center at the
University of Wisconsin, Madison, http://eucenter.wisc.edu. Accessed on
17 February 2003.
Note: PowerPoint presentations listed in the University of Madison website
were not included in the table.
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Secondly, although the Lisbon leaders coined the term ‘open
method of coordination’ and described its features, the story of
the OMC did not start at Lisbon. True, in some areas Lisbon was
the first step towards coordination. However, most policies had
already been the object of coordination. The Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines (Tepsa 2002; Hodson and Maher 2001), the
European Employment Strategy (Goetschy 1999; 2003; Trubek
and Mosher 2003), the soft law approach to social inclusion
(Ferrera, Matsaganis, Sacchi 2002), and the code of conduct in
business taxation (Radaelli 2002) – to name four areas in which
the OMC has been employed – did not originate at Lisbon.
Other policy applications of the method were entirely new, how-
ever.
To understand this mix of new and old one has to think of the
OMC as legitimising discourse2. In a sense, Lisbon was more a
focal point for bringing together existing (yet scattered) policy
practices in a new discourse – although policy areas such as
taxation were not even mentioned at that summit – than ‘day
one’ of the new method. As such, the March 2000 European
Coun-´cil was instrumental in forging the open method as dis-
course. The OMC as discourse yielded political coherence to
existing practices. But it also generated task expansion: some
policies mentioned in the Lisbon conclusions – such as educa-
tion – had not experimented any form of real coordination up
until then.
The third remark is that although it is useful to examine the
OMC as ideal type, its features vary considerably across policy
areas. We will turn to this issue in a moment, when we will
discuss the specific policies in which the method is currently
being used. But it is useful to bear in mind that the OMC:
1 The Forum contains a selection of OMC studies based on several criteria.
It is a representative selection, but not exhaustive.
2 The reference is to legitimacy within the circle of EU leaders.
See Section 6 for a wider notion of legitimacy.
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‘is not some kind of fixed recipe that can be applied to any is-
sue- (…) Policy co-ordination and open co-ordination together
constitute a cookbook that contains various recipes, lighter and
heavier ones’ (Vandenbrouke 2002:9). 
If it is wrong to focus on Lisbon alone, then in order to under-
stand the OMC one needs to look for structural reasons be-
hind its emergence. In this vein, one question is how did we get
there? Lisbon is a snapshot that has to be put in the context of a
more dynamic film. 
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4. A METHOD EMBEDDED IN THE MASTER
DISCOURSE OF COMPETITIVENESS
The argument presented here is that the OMC is an attempt to
get to grips with long-standing problems in the search for com-
petitiveness in Europe. ‘Lisbon Europe’ (this is the term used
by Laffan 2002) launched the challenge of making the EU ‘the
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in
the world, capable of sustaining economic growth with more
and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (Presidency Con-
clusions). However, the problem of competitiveness was one of
the main motivations behind the Single European Act (1986),
which indeed was presented as a way out of political and
economic Euro-sclerosis. With the Treaty provisions on
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) Europe tried to achieve
more competitiveness by undertaking the project of a single cur-
rency. The White Paper on growth, competitiveness and employ-
ment (1993) linked explicitly economic growth, infrastructural
projects, and employment, trying to demonstrate that the goals
of economic and employment policy were complementary. The
idea of large infrastructural projects did not fly. But the White
Paper prompted the decisions taken at the 1994 Essen Council
concerning a Europe-wide response to unemployment.
In the second half of the 1990s EU policy-makers tried to
identify a strategy for competitiveness by dint of the ambitious
projects of technological convergence and the information
society, following the Bangemann report of 1994. Towards the
end of the 1990s, the ‘information society’ turned into the
‘knowledge society’, to reflect the role of society and education
policies in the context of technological change (Rodrigues 2002).
Throughout the 1990s, one obstacle to the formation and im-
plementation of a EU strategy for competitiveness was the lack
of shared beliefs on what the European model of capitalism
should be. There is plenty of evidence of markedly different be-
liefs on European capitalism. Think of the political vicissitudes
of the White Paper on growth, competitiveness, and employment
the recent disagreements about the functioning of EMU, the con-
cept of public service, the appropriate reach of competition
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policy, and the role of the European Court of Justice in sensitive
policy areas. Scientific research has indeed demonstrated that
there are different models of capitalism in Europe3. These
models are based on different norms, work through different
institutions, and produce different responses to the challenges of
increased competition in an integrated world economy. 
Add to this the fact that, in order to achieve competitiveness,
substantial policy reforms are needed in politically sensitive
areas, such as labour market and pensions. The puzzle for
European leaders is how to produce these policy reforms with-
out confronting the deep normative, perhaps even ideological,
fracture over the model of capitalism most suitable for the EU.
History has shown that it is simply impossible (and ultimately
illegitimate) to make national models converge around a single
EU template. 
The solution that gradually emerged in the second half of the
1990s – and was then embodied in the Lisbon conclusions – was
to ‘de-couple’ complex policy problems and to some extent
‘mute’ the most acute political controversies by devising a new
method. The term ‘de-coupling’ is well-described by Laffan
(2002). Suffice here to notice that one characteristic of the OMC
is to make progress in politically sensitive areas by ‘avoiding’
politicisation. How is this possible? Essentially, by seeking
to tap knowledge, specific ways of improving on the status
quo, and innovations that can be diffused from one system to
another. This micro-orientation breaks down political com-
plexities into smaller compounds that are more manageable. It
also brackets political conflict. In the ideal-type of the OMC
(the reality may well differ), there is no attempt to forge a
European ‘vision’ of capitalism. 
This does not mean that there is no hierarchy of policies. Indeed,
competitiveness acts as ‘master discourse’ for the OMC in the
3 On models of capitalism see Hall and Soskice (2001). Ferrera, Hemerijck,
and Rhodes (2001a) report on different types of welfare states in Europe.
Crouch (1993) explains how state traditions in Europe have shaped industri-
al relations systems.
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sense of providing a set of shared beliefs on the main problems
and priorities of the EU economy. The emphasis on competitive-
ness appears in the pivotal position of the Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines (BEPG) in relation to the other policy areas
in which the OMC is used. The master discourse allows for suf-
ficient political space to debate employment policy and social
policy in relative isolation from harsh ‘high politics’ confron-
tations. Thus, the OMC can be described as a ‘political space’
wherein sensitive policies can be made without clashing over
the norms and values of models of capitalism. 
This solution has its own limits, however. Indeed, the more the
OMC produces results and gets closer to the formulation of
clear EU goals (as stated in the Lisbon conclusions), the more
it is difficult to avoid politicisation. This tension is endemic to
the OMC. It demarcates the perimeter of the non-conflictual
political space. It is aggravated when national elections produce
radically different governing coalitions in Europe. It may be-
come a key issue with the increasing differentiation produced
by enlargement. 
Arguably, the challenge of competitiveness is the strongest
structural force behind the identification of new modes of
governance for the Union. But there are at least other three
reasons leading to new modes of governance:
1) The policy process of the EU has changed. One the one hand,
legitimate diversity and subsidiary are firm points in the pro-
cess. One the other, EMU has increased the level and com-
plexity of policy interdependency. Think of the link between
EMU, macroeconomic policy, and social policy (Begg and
Berghman 2002:187-188; Mayes 2002). In order to deliver,
EMU needs reforms of the European labour markets, especi-
ally in the context of enlargement. Additionally, EMU-
induced growth will not solve social policy problems; simu-
lation exercises show that the coordination of social policy
may attenuate these problems (Mayes 2002). One implication
is that ‘coordination’ in the OMC refers both to the level of
specific policies (coordinated among the Member States) and
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to coordination between economic and social policies. The
more the latter is achieved, the more the benefits of the OMC
as a technology capable of muting politics and de-coupling
issues will disappear. This is yet another tension endemic to
the OMC. It is indeed impossible to handle coordination be-
tween social and economic policies without shared beliefs on
the roles of the state and the market in Europe.
2) New policy paradigms have exposed the limitations of tra-
ditional legal instruments and harmonisation. The reference
is to the impact of new public management and new re-
gulatory paradigms. New policy instruments based on alter-
natives to traditional regulation have been used both at the
EU and domestic level. The verdict on how far they can go
and what they can achieve is mixed (Zito, Radaelli, and
Jordan 2003). However, their impact on policy-makers’ ideas
of governance, public administration, and government has
been vast. New paradigms have provided the background
wherein the OMC can be seen as a better way forward.
‘Better’ in the sense that soft law is no longer seen as a
second-best option in cases wherein legislation cannot be
produced. Rather, the soft approach embodied in the OMC
is seen as superior to traditional approaches because it
fosters learning and provides flexibility to the policy process.
3) The third reason has something to do with legal constraints.
In education policy or direct taxation there is a thin or non-
existent treaty base. In these areas, the obstacles to legal
harmonisation come from the Treaties. New regulatory
paradigms may make legal harmonisation look obsolete (see
point two above), but in the first place there are legal con-
straints that are difficult to overcome. The relationship be-
tween the OMC and legal constraints has more dynamism
than one would think, however. True, legal constraints should
not be underestimated. However, in employment, social poli-
cy, and pensions the OMC has emerged neck to neck with
(proposed) directives and regulations. In direct taxation, the
soft-law mechanisms of the OMC are nested into a wider
package containing two directives. In pensions, an embryo-
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nic form of OMC has been accompanied by the draft
occupational pensions directive presented by the Com-
mission in 2002. And in employment policy, the OMC is
thriving on nothing less than the treaty articles inserted at
Amsterdam. To conclude on this point, legal constraints play
a role, but more in defining a dynamic relation between the
OMC and EU law than in making soft-law the only show in
town.
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5. THE OMC AS NEW MODE OF GOVERNANCE
One of the key questions in this report is to what extent is the
OMC a new governance architecture for the EU? As shown
above, structural change creates momentum for new modes of
governance. But is the OMC a form of new governance? The
issue has been discussed by several authors, such as Odervest
(2002), Scott and Trubek (2002), and Trubek and Mosher
(2003). Some of them (Scott and Trubek 2002) note that the
OMC is just one example of new modes of governance. Accord-
ingly, it should be examined in the context of other method-
ologies used in the EU policy process to forge new governance
architectures for public policies4.
Other authors have gone even further than ‘new governance’ in
general: they have addressed the OMC as ‘deliberative govern-
ance’ (Jacobsson and Vifell 2003), drawing on the description
of ‘directive-deliberative’ governance provided by Cohen and
Sabel (1997, see also Cohen and Sabel 2003 on the comparison
between the US and the EU). The case for the OMC as new
mode of governance rests on six characteristics of the method:
1) New, and more limited, role of law. The role of law is
different than in traditional governance (Scott and Trubek
2002). In the OMC, there is no real demarcation between
rule-making and rule-implementation. Another difference is
that courts do not provide the main mechanisms of account-
ability. Parenthetically, this explains why the criticisms of the
OMC often focus on accountability.
2) New approach to problem-solving. In its ideal-typical
format, the method works by dint of iteration, mutual co-
operation (across levels of government and between public
and private actors), and standard-settings. There is a lively
discussion on the nature of learning in OMC problem-solv-
4 Heritier (2001) has produced preliminary evidence of how different
‘new modes’ are used in the EU.
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ing. Authors such as Jacobsson argue that learning is top-
down. Member States have to implement the guidelines set
at the European level. By contrast, American authors (such
as Trubek, Cohen and Sabel) are more inclined to stress the
potential of open coordination for bottom-up learning. The
idea – they argue – is that there is a solution somewhere, but
it cannot be provided by hierarchy. Therefore, the OMC acti-
vates a network that searches the solution. As such, the OMC
works like a radar. The similarities with governance in sys-
tems based on networks (instead of hierarchy) are clear. The
text of the Lisbon conclusions contain evidence for both
schools of thought. On the one hand, there is a reference to
EU goals, convergence, and guidelines that Member States
are supposed to meet – a reference that sounds like top-down
dynamics. On the other, the text insists on mutual learning
processes and development of domestic policies at a pace
that is not dictated by Brussels – something close to bottom-
up dynamics. If Lisbon contains the template of the OMC, it
is fair to conclude that the template leaves the question of the
relative weight of local knowledge versus top-down learning
open.
3) Participation is a key feature of the process. ‘Power-sharing’
is higher than in traditional legislation (Scott and Trubek
2002:5). Both different levels of government and the civil so-
ciety participate. Participation is essential for two reasons.
One is obvious, that is, legitimacy. The other is less obvious:
effectiveness. The method can work like a radar searching so-
lutions only if it involves many different actors. According
to Zeitlin, the OMC radar must tap the benefits of local
knowledge and local experimentation (Zeitlin 2002). Accord-
ingly, participation should not be limited to those who ope-
rate in EU-level committees, but it should be extended to
local-level actors. As explained above (point 2), the different
emphasis on local or EU-level actors reflects the way
different authors look at bottom-up or top-down learning.
4) Diversity and subsidiary – as explained above – are in-built.
The open method acknowledges diversity up front. It is
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based on the assumption of different models of capitalism
which find their own solutions to the problems generated
by the challenges of complexity and competitiveness. More
traditional modes of governance point to harmonisation,
instead.
5) New ways to produce usable knowledge. The OMC is
supposed to work like a network looking for usable know-
ledge at all levels. The specific instruments are coherent with
the goal of learning – at least in principle (see below on real-
world problems). Think of benchmarking, peer review,
multi-lateral surveillance, scoreboards, trend-charts and
other mechanisms for trans-national policy diffusion. It is
less clear whether the design of the open method contains
specific and coherent instruments for bottom-up learning.
6) This leads to the final point, that is, policy learning. The
greatest advantage of the open method is that it has con-
siderable potential for policy learning. By learning from
local knowledge and by generating trans-national diffusion,
policy-makers can improve at their own pace. 
To conclude: the case for the open method as new governance
architecture can be made. But it must be stressed that all the six
points, and especially the last one, refer to the ideal-typical
characteristics. The emphasis here is on ‘potential’ for learning.
Whether the open method has actually generated considerable
learning across countries, across levels of governments, and
across policies is another question, to be addressed later on in
this report.
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6. NEW GOVERNANCE UNDER PRESSURE:
THE PROBLEM OF ENDEMIC TENSION
The fact that there is a new mode of governance in the EU does
not mean that it will work. Indeed, there are several elements of
tension in this mode of governance. The argument aired in this
report is that tension is endemic. This generates an in-built limi-
tation to what the OMC can achieve. Although at the level of
specific policy areas tension can be attenuated, depending on a
number of circumstances, a number of in-built contradictions
(put differently, endemic tension) define some trade-offs and
limitations from which policy-makers experimenting with the
OMC cannot escape.
To begin with, as argued above, there is an element of tension
in that the OMC seeks to de-couple issues, promote diversity,
and mute politics. But policy interdependency and the need to
coordinate policies (within the ‘master discourse’ of competi-
tiveness) push towards politicisation and conflict over the EU
‘model(s)’ of capitalism. There is a contradiction between the
emphasis on the method as an instrument used by Member
States to develop ‘at their own pace’ and the objective need to
steer the process of policy change in the direction of ‘conver-
gence towards the EU goals’ (both appear in the Lisbon conclu-
sions). Both the official rhetoric and academic studies are some-
what ambiguous on this issue of diversity versus convergence.
Moreover, it is not clear what type of convergence one has in
mind: convergence of goals, convergence of discourse, or con-
vergence at the level of policies? There are expectations in terms
of convergence of policies, as Biagi reported three years ago
(2000:159):
‘Consistent application of the Luxembourg exercise might lead
to a convergence of Member States’ employment and labour
policies, not dictated by Brussels but based on a growing
consensus on effective solutions through a process of trial and
error’.
However, it seems that the main result so far is convergence
at the level of ideas, concepts, norms defining good and bad
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practice, and ultimately policy discourse – an issue to which we
will turn when discussing the achievements.
Another contradiction arises out of the fact that the OMC is
cast in the strategy to make Europe the most competitive know-
ledge society in the world. As argued above, the OMC is the
most recent step in the struggle for competitiveness that started
with the single market. At the same time, a good deal of policy-
makers and academics look at the open method as an instrument
to build ‘social Europe’. Although at the general level the re-
calibration of the welfare state and the challenge of competi-
tiveness are not mutually exclusive (Ferrera, Hemerijck and
Rhodes 2001b), empirical evidence from employment policy,
social policy, pensions, and taxation points to conflicts between
those organisations and policy-makers that put a premium on
competitiveness and those who make ‘social Europe’ their
ultimate goals. Occasionally, this element of tension re-surfaces
in the discussion between the advocates of the method as a
learning tool (that is, the OMC as cognitive instrument) and
those willing to bring norms and values back into the process
(with the consequence of aggravating the conflict over models
of capitalism). The following quote from a prominent Belgian
politician is quite clear:
‘The open method of co-ordination is both a cognitive and a
normative tool. It is a “cognitive” tool, because it allows us to
learn from each other. In my opinion, this learning process is
not restricted to the practice of other Member States, but also
extends to their underlying views and opinions, an area that is
no less important. Open co-ordination is a “normative” tool be-
cause, necessarily, common objectives embody substantive
views on social justice. Thus open co-ordination gradually
creates a European social policy paradigm’ (Vandenbrouke
2002:9).
Add to this the fact that the advocates of ‘the European social
model’ have to reconcile their claims with the considerable
diversity of welfare state models in the European Union (Begg
et al. 2001) and that enlargement will certainly increase the
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amount of diversity. The question is how can one speak of one
‘European social model’ when evidence from employment
policy points to a conflict among models, so much so that the
real politics of the OMC in this area is all about finding out
which models are under pressure (de la Porte 2002) and which
models are more suitable (in new hybrid forms, perhaps, see
Bertozzi and Bonoli 2002) as possible templates for the Europ-
ean Employment Strategy? A final element of complexity for
those willing to use the OMC to create ‘social Europe’ is that
recent research (Wincott 2003) demonstrates that:
(i) the ‘EU social model’ is more a discourse sponsored by
some political elites in some countries than reality;
(ii) EU social policy has been so far more ‘American’ in style
and content than ‘European’. Wincott (2003) argues that
it is perfectly possible that even in the future EU social
policy ‘will serve to reinforce the influence of US style
approaches (by way of the British government) to social and
employment policy (workfare and labour marker flex-
ibility)’.
Concluding on this point, if and when there is tension between
competitiveness and ‘social Europe’, the task is easier for those
pushing for competitiveness. Not only is competitiveness the
master discourse which led to Lisbon, but the notion of ‘the
European social model’ brings in a number of contradictions
that make this ‘social values’ project structurally weak. With an
important qualification, however. This report will argue (in Sec-
tion 8, footnote 15, and in the conclusions) that one way to limit
this tension is to look at social and employment policies that, by
increasing the flexibility of labour, increase competitiveness and
provide social protection.
Be that as it may, the list of contradictions contains a final item,
that is, the tension between competition and cooperation. Some
of the elements of the OMC, notably benchmarking, are used by
companies in the private sector to become more competi-
tive. The notion of learning contemplates the possibility that
a country acquires new knowledge from other countries, de-
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ciphers the lessons to be drawn, adapts innovation to the
domestic context, and ultimately becomes more competitive. At
the same time, the emphasis on information-sharing, common
guidelines, performance indicators for the whole of the EU, and
coordination among policy areas pushes in the direction of co-
operation. For the actors involved in the OMC, the challenge is
to find the right balance between cooperation and competition.
This is not an impossible task, because one can think of a co-
operative policy regime within which Member States find their
own ways to enhance competitiveness, but the balance is de-
licate, and not easy to sustain in time. On this front, arguably
the most problematic area is taxation, where Member States are
competing for capital, yet they acknowledge the benefits of co-
operation against extreme forms of tax competition. 
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7. COMPARING THE METHOD
ACROSS POLICY AREAS
After having looked at open coordination as new mode of go-
vernance and its contradictions, the next step is to discuss how
the method is used in specific policies. One result will be that
the ideal-type of the OMC allows for considerable variability of
formats, rationales, and results across policy areas. Perhaps the
closest one can get to the ideal-type described in the Lisbon
conclusions is the European Employment Strategy. Other policy
areas either do not contain all the elements of the OMC (in a
sense, they represent lighter versions) or deviate from the tem-
plate in one respect or another. The list of policy areas is rather
long, and varies from one official document to another. One can
group policies in three categories. The first group includes
policies where there is a deliberate attempt to use the OMC as
the main ‘working method’. This group includes:
• Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
• European Employment Strategy
• Social Inclusion
• Pensions5.
The second group includes areas where EU policy-makers have
manifested their intention to use the OMC, but – so far at least
– only a minimal component of the instruments and practice at
work in these policies correspond to the ‘method’. This group
includes:
• Innovation and RDT policies
• Education
• Information society
• Environmental policy
• Health care.
5 The use of the OMC in pensions is still embryonic.
See Pochet (2003) on what has been achieved so far.
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Finally, direct taxation is the only case wherein policy-makers
have used an innovative combination of OMC instruments and
practices, but without any deliberative intention to use the
method. Accordingly, one can label this group ‘open coordina-
tion in disguise’.
The list of policies covered by the three categories is quite long.
However, the list of policies making use of the full template de-
scribed in the Lisbon conclusions is short, and arguably does
not go much further than employment policy and the BEPG,
with social inclusion close to the template but not yet quite
there. This is not a paradox. Simply, it is an implication of open
coordination as discourse. Thus, there are grandiose references
to the ‘use of the OMC to develop policies’ in the official web-
sites of the EU covering innovation policy and education
policy. The reality is that it is still difficult to find traces of the
template in the current development of these policies. Open
coordination is a very attractive discursive bandwagon. It pro-
vides a politically useful label to various policy initiatives; it
helps policy-makers and academics to make sense of complex
realities; it justifies task expansion in areas where hard law is
an unattainable goal.
With this caveat in mind, and perhaps at the cost of being sub-
jugated by the OMC fascination that makes different things look
similar, let us examine some policy areas comparatively. In
order to analyse these policy areas in a coherent comparative
fashion, it is useful to consider a sample of policies from all the
three categories. The policies selected for this exercise are the
BEPG, the European Employment Strategy, Social Inclusion,
Innovation, Pensions, and Direct Business Taxation. Table two
provides information on a range of dimensions used for this
comparison. To begin with (column one), one can see that the
OMC is being used both in policy areas where there is a solid
treaty base (employment) and in areas where the treaty base is
thin or non-existent. In addition, the relationship between the
OMC and hard law is quite dynamic. As observed above, in pen-
sions and taxation new modes of governance hinge crucially (in
a sense, they are nested into) on traditional instruments such as
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directives. As mentioned, in tax policy the code of conduct
against harmful tax competition is a component of a tax
package containing directives. Member States thus bargain
at the code’s table with an eye to the progress made in the nego-
tiation of the directive on the taxation of savings and the direc-
tive on the cross-border taxation of interests and royalties.
The second column shows guidelines and specific sets of in-
dicators. The OMC as process starts with the formulation of
guidelines, followed by the agreement on a list of indicators.
National plans are then developed by using the agreed lists of
indicators and benchmarks. They are used to compare national
results and to identify best or good practice. The final step is the
‘monitoring, peer-review, and evaluation’ stage of the process.
This should provide learning opportunities that feed-back into
the development of national policy and the re-formulation of
guidelines.
There are not many processes that follow this template, apart
from the BEPG and employment. Social inclusion comes close,
although indicators are less precise than in employment policy.
The crucial link is the one between indicators and national
action plans. Indicators guide policy if they inform domestic de-
cisions. Otherwise they are still useful for benchmarking, but
do not really provide orientation to the preparation of national
policy. In social inclusion up until 2001 the Member States
could use any set of data, but starting with the plan for 2003 they
were requested to use the primary and secondary indicators
agreed by the Social Protection Committee. A third range of in-
dicators (optional tertiary indicators) can be used flexibly to ac-
commodate the peculiarities of each Member State (Ferrera,
Matsaganis and Sacchi 2002:233). 
Indicators are currently discussed in pension reforms, but here
the process has been subverted. National pension strategy re-
ports have been presented by Member States without previous
agreement on indicators. Accordingly, these plans do nothing
more than describing the trajectories of domestic policies.
Indeed, they are not called national action plans – arguably an
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acknowledgement of the fact that they do not contain a list of
actions that are supposed to meet the guidelines and the in-
dicators agreed in Brussels. The term ‘strategy report’ is more
elusive than ‘action plan’. However, eleven ‘broad common
objectives’ for pensions were agreed by the Social Protection
Committee and the Economic Policy Committee – an example
of fine balance between economic and social policy logic (SPC-
EPC 2001: 6-7). So far the main function of the pension OMC
has been to feed information and strategies into the formulation
of the BEPG. For this reason, commentators like de la Porte
(2003 forthcoming:9) do not consider this OMC ‘a process in
its own right’. 
The main instruments used in innovation policy are the Euro-
pean innovation scoreboard, the European trend-chart on in-
novation, surveys of innovation policy measures, reviews of
policies, and workshops on trans-national policy learning
(http://trendchart.cordis.lu/be). The scoreboard contains 17 in-
dicators on knowledge creation, technology transfer, innovation
finance, and innovation outputs. The Commission has made the
suggestion that Member States use the results of the scoreboard
‘to define, where appropriate, national targets or policy pri-
orities’6. This is an extremely light use of the indicators when
compared to the use in the European Employment Strategy.
There are no indicators in tax policy, but Member States use a
set of criteria to identify harmful tax competition. 
The examination of guidelines and indicators has revealed
a substantial diversity within the OMC ‘template’. The next
column in table two refers to peer review. Here again at first
glance the OMC template seems coherent, but the reality is that
peer review means different things in different policies. Peer
review in pension policy has been quite light so far, with short
presentations of descriptive national plans followed by some
questions prepared in advance (de la Porte and Nanz 2003). Peer
review in innovation policy is more oriented towards the review
6 See http://trendchart.cordis.lu/AboutUs/pg_04.htm.
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of successful policies than towards the evaluation of national
plans. In taxation, there is no review of national policies, but
target review of specific tax regimes included in a list of
potentially harmful measures. The list is compiled by asking
for submissions from Member States7 and by including entries
suggested by the Commission. 
Benchmarking is widely diffused, but in this case again one has
to be aware of the different context and political goals in which
this technique is used. Taxation, for example, provides a curious
case of benchmarking, that is, Member States benchmark their
tax systems against ‘worst’ or unacceptable practice. In this
policy, the difference of opinions in terms of what is a ‘good’
tax policy model is such that Member States managed to agree
only on what is harmful practice. This mirror-image of best
practice shows that tax policy-makers are more engaged
in avoiding policy failures (the lack of tax policy coordination
at the international level has been described as a prisoner’s
dilemma in which all participants lose revenue) than in learning
from ‘best’ or ‘good’ practice.
One way to put pressure on Member States is to use the instru-
ment of recommendations, although their effectiveness is still
debated (see Hodson and Maher 2001 on the Irish case). Only
the BEPG and the employment OMC use recommendations. It
would be a mistake, however, to translate the presence or
absence of ‘sanctioning’ mechanisms such as recommendations
in terms of effectiveness of the OMC. The latter works eminent-
ly by dint of learning and convergence of beliefs about ‘good
policy’. The logic, therefore, is not one of command and con-
trol. Rather, it is a logic of experimentation, incentives, perhaps
even deliberation (Eberlein and Kerwer 2002; see however the
issues raised by de la Porte and Nanz 2003). Sanctioning
mechanisms play a limited role in this logic.
7 Hence, a country can ask the Council group in charge of the code of
conduct to look into a tax regime of another Member State. For this reason
the Council group was literally snowed under almost 300 suggestions of
potentially harmful tax regimes.
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The column on ‘Council formation’ in table two shows that
in pension policy the Social Protection Committee and the
Economic Policy Committee have to strike a balance between
the economic-fiscal logic of pension reforms and the social
policy aspects. This has brought together different types of
actors, although so far social partners have participated less than
the business community and Ecofin has steered the pension pro-
cess. But the pre-conditions for a more balanced participation
of actors are there, and the situation may change in the future
(Pochet 2003). The Social Affairs and Labour Council is
obviously the main formation involved in the employment and
social inclusion processes, although the results achieved by the
European Employment Strategy have to be consistent with the
macro-economic policy designed by Ecofin via the BEPG.
The ‘innovation policy’ open method has been so far a process
managed by DG enterprise, with limited involvement of the
Council. The Commission has sought to work as a platform for
policy transfer and learning at the level of experts from different
ministries and ‘innovation enterprises’ (agencies, often funded
by governments but not entirely, that assist in the diffusion of
applied knowledge). 
It is difficult to assess the ‘nature’ of the various OMCs portray-
ed in table two. Are they more political or more technical? The
terms ‘political’ and ‘technical’ lead to confusion. In a sense, all
open methods are technical. Indicators are discussed by experts,
national plans are drafted by civil servants, and peer reviews
have a technical nature. However, there is a difference between
processes in which the discussion involves high-level policy-
makers and deals with political issues and processes where the
role of politics is more limited. Judged from this perspective,
almost all processes are political, with the exception of innova-
tion policy. Although more research – and more precision – on
this issue is needed, the tentative conclusion is that the OMC is
not muting politics. 
Participation – last column in table two reports on social part-
ners – is an important component of the OMC as new mode of
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governance. It is striking to observe how little has the OMC
delivered on its promises. Participation is minimal in taxation
(the code of conduct group can be described as a cartel of
Finance Ministers) and the BEPG. In employment, participation
of trade unions, business organisations, and social movements
reflects national styles of participation. Put differently, society
participates in the OMC when domestic policy styles are already
tuned towards participation. The implication is that (at least
up until now) the open method has not changed participatory
patterns in Member States. 
In innovation policy participation is not at high political levels,
but – as mentioned earlier on – at the level of stakeholders
(civil servants from national ministries and the business com-
munity) and bodies promoted by governments to diffuse in-
novation (so-called ‘innovation enterprises’, innovation centres,
companies providing seed capital, and so on). The loose and
technical nature of open coordination in this area has enabled
participation of the main stakeholders.
In pension policy the business community has seen an oppor-
tunity to enter a wider European market for pension funds and
other products. Social partners have not been the primary
actors, although they are increasingly involved. Finally, in the
case of social inclusion, both NGOs (one example is the Euro-
pean Anti-Poverty Network) and more traditional social part-
ners have found a favourable structure of opportunities for
participation. This is an area where open coordination has
partially matched the ambition of the Lisbon architects to pro-
vide mechanisms of participatory governance.
However, national parliaments, regions, and local governments
have played a marginal role in all OMC processes described in
table two (Zeitlin 2002). This is a serious deficiency for a
method that draws heavily on the possibility to tap the benefits
of local knowledge (Zeitlin 2002). Finally, the European Parlia-
ment has not been able to be involved beyond mere consultation
– a point that the new Inter-Governmental Conference should
address.
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8. A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE OMC
It is still to early to provide a comprehensive assessment of the
OMC. The problem is compounded by the fact that the large ma-
jority of studies published on the method is either normative or
interested in the analysis of the ideal-typical characteristics of
this new mode of governance. Good-quality empirical analyses
including an assessment of the impact on domestic beliefs, de-
cisions, and policies are still scarce. Consequently, this Section
provides only a tentative and preliminary assessment of the
method by raising the following three questions:
• Does the method provide an efficient platform for policy
learning?
• Is it effective? What do we know in terms of actual results?
What has been achieved so far?
• How can one assess the method from the point of view of
legitimacy?
Put differently, having established that the OMC has the po-
tential to provide a new governance architecture (albeit with en-
demic tensions), the question arises whether this architecture
fosters learning, is effective, and legitimate. It is to these issues
that we now turn, commencing with learning.
8.1 A platform for learning?
In its ideal-typical form, the OMC has considerable potential
for learning in at least two directions. The emphasis on parti-
cipation and local knowledge should provide a platform for
bottom-up learning, whereas peer review and benchmarking –
if properly used – can generate cross-national policy diffusion
and learning. Turning to the metaphor of the method as a radar,
the idea is that the network structure of the OMC enables
policy-makers to detect innovative solutions – wherever they are
produced at the local level. 
However, where are the mechanisms that foster bottom-up
learning and cross-country innovation? There is a large litera-
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ture on policy transfer and policy learning. There are also some
studies on benchmarking in the EU (Lundvall and Tomlinson
2001;2002). To review this literature here would simply add
another layer of abstract and non-empirical conceptualisations
to our knowledge of the OMC. It is more useful to distil some
results of these studies that shed light on how the OMC actual-
ly works in the areas examined above.
The scant empirical information on learning in OMC processes
(especially in employment policy, but there is also preliminary
evidence in innovation policy) directs us towards a problem
acknowledged by the Commission itself: up until now, the
amount of learning ‘from the bottom’ and across-countries has
been limited. One explanation for this is that participation falls
short of the ideal-type of participatory governance designed at
Lisbon. If the OMC is all about tapping the benefits of local
knowledge, poor participatory governance is a serious hin-
drance to learning. One key mechanism envisaged by the
Lisbon architects is simply not working.
The second explanation suggested here is that learning in the
context of the OMC is a political exercise. Policy-makers are
not seeking truth, but power. They may be open to reasoned ar-
gumentation, but not to the point of overcoming the basic fact
that they are engaged with politically-sensitive policies such as
the re-calibration of the welfare state, industrial policy, and taxa-
tion. 
Let us make some examples. To choose a set of indicators, to
designate an innovation as ‘good practice’, to undertake a
benchmarking exercise, and to write guidelines are all political
processes. They establish hierarchies of domestic solutions, they
put pressure on some versions of the ‘European social model’
but not on others, or, in the case of taxation, they alter the com-
parative advantage of all Member States8. To assume that a de-
politicised, positive-sum game learning is the most common
feature of the OMC is simply wrong. To repeat, the point is that
8 Tax-competitive countries using harmful practice lose from coordination,
whereas others may gain.
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learning in the OMC is almost always political, often hierarchi-
cal, and invariably based on a mix of cooperative and conflictual
attitudes. Consequently, some of the OMC mechanisms work
differently (that is, more politically) than one would expect.
A third reason may have something to do with the limitations of
benchmarking and best practice (Radaelli 2004). Let us look at
the limitations of benchmarking first and then raise the ques-
tion whether they really matter in the OMC processes examined
here.
Instruments such as benchmarking have been adopted enthusi-
astically. Benchmarking in a political context may act as an
obstacle to learning, however. It may reduce diversity and
heterogeneity – two essential properties of evolutionary lear-
ning systems (Lundvall and Tomlinson 2002:208). It may focus
policy-makers on specific micro-innovations, thus ignoring the
holistic components of success and the systemic nature of po-
licies. By focusing on success, benchmarking may not reflect
enough on the lessons provided by failures (the so-called nega-
tive lessons). If based on best practice, benchmarking may
ignore the simple fact that in the public sector the definition of
success is problematic. Benchmarking may encourage imitation,
but successful competitive strategies are more based on distinc-
tive and unique aspects. Both in the private and in the public
sector, it is customary to distinguish between a cooperative and
a competitive form of benchmarking. Given its emphasis on
imitation (together with adaptation, of course), OMC benchmar-
king is certainly more cooperative than competitive9. This may
be a problem if one wants to enhance the degree of competition
among EU countries.
Professor Porter from the Harvard Business School once told
the Financial Times that:
‘Companies focus on the latest trend, the newest technologies
and what their competitors are doing – and they are constantly
trying to emulate best practice. It is important to be operatio-
9 See also Lundvall and Tomlinson (2002:211).
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nally efficient to be competitive, but it is not enough. There
is a crying need for a distinctive strategy’ (Financial Times,
‘Crucial importance of clear business goals’, Interview by Rod
Newing, 5 June 2002).
As the Commission (2000) duly acknowledged with reference
to innovation policy, OMC aims at diffusing good practice, thus
creating convergence. But benchmarking should also respect the
diversity of national systems of innovation. Can EU policy-
makers have the cake and eat it? As Lundvall and Tomlinson
observe (2002:227), ‘a more explicit reflection on how to re-
concile the two sets of ideas in operational terms would have
been useful’.
Finally, benchmarking may hinder learning by bracketing the
institutional context. A number of institutional, political, and in-
stitutional circumstances are often neglected in benchmarking
exercises in the public sector because of the assumption of total
fungibility of best practice (Rose 2002). However, in all pro-
cesses of policy innovation there are elements that cannot be
transferred from one country to another without taking into
account institutional legacies, state traditions, and the dominant
legal culture.
For these reasons, it is useful to contrast the benchmarking
approach with a more context-sensitive ‘lesson-drawing’
approach, based on an explicit acknowledgement of the role of
institutions and legacies, and open to both positive and negative
lessons10. 
Do these criticisms really matter? The answer is ‘yes, but the
situation is improving’. There is a continuum of options (not
a black and white choice) between de-contextualised bench-
marking based on ‘best practice’ and context-sensitive lesson
drawing. Although the Lisbon conclusions seem to ignore
lesson-drawing, the reality is that the OMC processes have
started with a-critical uses of benchmarking but are moving
10 For an illustration of lesson-drawing see Rose (2002). See Radaelli (2004)
on the contrast between lesson-drawing and best practice.
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towards context-sensitive methodologies. For example, instead
of assuming that totally fungible best practices exist, the OMC
often works with ‘good’ practices (‘worst’ practice in the case
of taxation) to be adapted to specific institutional contexts.
Recent EU workshops on innovation policy have explicitly
addressed the notion of lesson-drawing11. Discussions on intel-
ligent benchmarking in the OMC (Lundvall and Tomlinson
2002) have begun, although we are still waiting for the results
generated by these discussions. It is fair to say that the reflection
on intelligent benchmarking and how do draw usable lessons
from other countries is still limited to innovation policy. One
recommendation to be presented at the end of this report is
to encourage an open acknowledgement of the advantages of
lesson-drawing and of the limitations of benchmarking.
To conclude on learning, open coordination has potential for
learning, but it has not delivered, due to limitations in terms of
participation, the political aspects of learning, and the still in-
sufficiently critical discussion of benchmarking and possible
alternatives such as lesson-drawing.
8.2 An effective instrument?
Let us turn to the question of effectiveness. This is a tricky
question. It is too early to assess this dimension. And it is not
clear whether one should assess it across policy areas (i.e., is
the method effective in providing coordination across policy
areas?) or policy by policy. The issues of overall policy direc-
tion (what kind of Europe is currently being forged by open
coordination) and coherence (how coordinated is the open
method?) are important. Let us leave the ‘1billion-dollars’
question of direction to the end of this Section. 
What about coherence? If one considers all the OMC processes
listed in the previous Section (that is, the three categories of
open methods), one has to say that there has not been much
11 See the 27–28 November 2002 workshop on ‘Improving trans-national
policy earning in innovation’ (http://trendchart.cordis.lu/benchmarking)
organised by the European trend chart on innovation (DG Enterprise).
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coordination. Not yet, at least. However, in 2002 the Com-
mission released a communication – well received by the 2002
Barcelona Council – on streamlining the annual economic and
employment processes (Commission 2002). The aims in this
communication are to synchronise the cycles of BEPG and em-
ployment, to give the Spring Council the chance to coordinate
different processes, to focus on policy implementation, and to
provide a medium-term strategy to the processes. The com-
munication does not include social inclusion policy12 and pen-
sions. The proposals formulated by the Commission re-affirm
the pivotal role of the BEPG – in line with the master discourse
of competitiveness. This may be a sensible way to produce coor-
dination, although social inclusion and the fiscal aspects of pen-
sion reforms should not be neglected. In this vein, the Conven-
tion working group on ‘Social Europe’ made a recommendation
to extend synchronisation to ‘all other aspects to which the
OMC is applied’ (European Convention 2003a:21).
This negative assessment of low coordination across policies
should be qualified13. The fact that the OMC has not achieved
much does not mean it has not achieved anything! Both employ-
ment policy and pension policy shows examples of effective
coordination. In the EES, the guidelines have been set jointly
by Ecofin and the Social Affairs and Labour Council. Pen-
sion policy shows an interesting example of integrating the
logic of economic goals and the logic of social protection in the
objectives agreed by the Social Protection Committee and the
Economic Policy Committee (SPS-EPC 2001). Finally, the
GOVECOR project (www.govecor.org) has provided evidence
of increased policy coordination at the national level (Jacobs-
son and Vifell 2002; see Linsenmann 2003 for a preliminary
assessment of ‘coordination of policy coordination’).
If one looks at the level of policy areas, preliminary research in-
dicates that the effects of the OMC differ according to policy
12 Note that the employment OMC has an annual cycle, whereas the social
policy process is biennial.
13 I am grateful to Kerstin Jacobsson for having pointed out this to me.
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area, welfare regime, country, and the position of key political
actors at the domestic level (de la Porte and Pochet 2002:17). And
within individual policies (notably, the European Employment
Strategy) some ‘pillars’ (employability) are stronger than others.
One result that employment policy and taxation have achieved
is (limited but significant) cognitive convergence14. The OMC
has been instrumental in creating common beliefs in these two
policy areas, and there is preliminary evidence of a similar
phenomenon in other processes, specifically in social inclusion.
Cognitive convergence refers to the identification of a common
set of beliefs about the main problems and the causal mecha-
nisms at work in a policy area. There is also evidence of em-
bryonic yet important convergence at the level of norms: notions
such as ‘harmful tax competition’ imply shared norms of what
is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in public policy. In
employment policy, Bertozzi and Bonoli (2002) describe the
characteristics of an emerging ‘EU desirable model’ which is an
hybrid of Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian instruments. They
note that this emerging model has been able to trigger achange
in the policy paradigm used by German policy-makers. We do
not know whether learning has taken place in other countries as
well, however. In the pension OMC, there has been agreement
at the level of beliefs about necessary reforms. However, this
agreement may be contested inthe future, if some actors
manage to break down the ‘economic’ discourse on pensions by
injecting more elements relating to ‘social’ considerations. 
To sum up then, the main result of the OMC – limited to some
specific policy issues, some countries, and still to be confirmed
by more systematic evidence – is ideational convergence. This
is extremely important as convergence at the level of ideas, and
perhaps desirable models, may alleviate the endemic tension de-
scribed above by delineating the contours of a possible ‘EU
social model’ and by suggesting how the latter may fit in with
the master discourse of competitiveness. Two qualifications are
in order, however. 
14 For empirical evidence see Bertozzi and Bonoli (2002) and Radaelli (2002).
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The first is that these elements of ideational convergence are
embryonic. It remains to be seen whether the OMC process will
make them more solid. The institutionalisation of ideas is a pro-
blematic process. The second consideration is that communities
of discourse may produce symbolic policies. A common voca-
bulary is used in Brussels, but domestic policy proceeds along
different tracks.
Indeed, following Brunsson (1989), one should not assume that
people or organisations belonging to the same community of
discourse take the same decisions. Convergence in ‘talk’ may
not produce convergence in decisions. Neither does it produce
the same actions: even if a decision is taken, implementation
may differ. Pollitt (2001:940) adds that even when there is con-
vergence in action the actual results may differ: ‘even deter-
mined implementation (actions) does not necessarily lead to
uniform or expected results’. The previous considerations of
the limited amount of policy learning so far achieved by the
OMC, together with the misalignment between national plans
discussed in Brussels and real policy decisions taken in natio-
nal capitals, provide evidence that the risk is real. Recent pro-
gress made in terms of tightening up the evaluation of national
plans, making them more evaluative, and the proposals of the
Commission for the synchronisation of different processes may
reduce this risk in the future. At the moment of writing this
report, we still do not know enough about the impact of the
OMC on domestic decisions and policy outcomes. 
One way – albeit somewhat speculative – to have a sense
of what the OMC policy impacts may be is to draw on the
literature on Europeanisation (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003).
The latter suggests the following:
• OMC as Europeanisation has two main effects. One is the
socialisation of elites (so far by dint of a common discourse,
although discourse is more contested in some areas than in
others). The other is the change in the domestic opportunity
structure. Some actors are objectively empowered by Euro-
peanisation. The impact of the OMC depends on whether
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these actors (arguably within coalitions for reform) have the
will and capability to use the resources provided by the OMC.
• Europeanisation produces differential effects, due inter alia
to the fact that domestic institutions refract European policy.
Hence one should not expect the OMC to produce conver-
gence at the level of policy results. Indeed, if open coordina-
tion is used by Member States to learn how to become more
competitive, and if some countries learn better and faster than
others, the final result may well be increasing differentiation
in the EU.
• Europeanisation works through different mechanisms. One is
adaptational pressure (the pressure to adapt to EU models, see
B(rzel and Risse 2003). To understand where the OMC has
more potential for policy change, one should look at countries
under adaptational pressure. South European countries are
under adaptational pressure in employment and social in-
clusion, whereas the UK and Ireland need to adapt to social
inclusion and taxation guidelines. Most pillars of the Euro-
pean employment strategy put key elements of the German
model in jeopardy. Whether these domestic policy systems
will really change as a result of adaptational pressure is a moot
point. If the divergence between the EU model and domestic
arrangements is too high, chances are that there will be no
change: inertia or even retrenchment will be the most-likely
outcome. Change is most probable when adaptational pressure
is at medium level. Further, adaptational pressure is somewhat
socially constructed: policy-makers may argue that their sys-
tem is fully compatible with EU guidelines whereas most of
their peers would think that there is considerable adaptational
pressure15. Finally, the more the identification of fundamental
EU goals remains vague, the least likely is that governments
will really have to adapt and ‘Europeanise’ their policy.
This leads to the final question about effectiveness. It makes
sense to talk about results only if the overall direction is clear.
The master discourse on competitiveness is a component of the
overall direction, but both policy-makers and academics are still
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in disagreement about the ultimate goals of the OMC exercise.
What does ‘re-calibration’ of the welfare state really mean?
What is the specific range of actions that would make ‘the
European social model’ compatible with the economic logic of
market integration and competitiveness? Can the BEPG provide
sufficient guidance to the overall process? Is the OMC an alter-
native or a complement to hard regulation? Does the EU want
to become more or less tax competitive? 
Those are NOT impossible questions to answer16, but politically
they certainly are hard nuts to crack. Perhaps the OMC is the
best way to tackle these questions, but it is fair to say that the
overall direction is not clear at the moment. In the absence of
overall direction, one cannot say if the ‘goals’ of the OMC are
being achieved or not.
15 A good example was provided by the initial reactions of national delega-
tions to the criteria against harmful tax competition. Most national delega-
tions said they had nothing to fear from these criteria, although most com-
mentators thought that some countries had more to change than others.
16 See de la Porte and Pochet (2002). Some would argue, however, that they
cannot be answered by looking at the OMC alone. Scharpf (2002) has ob-
served that even assuming perfect functioning and ‘optimal learning’, the
open method will never put the logic of social protection in the driving seat.
The logic of economic efficiency and market integration – he argues – will
remain dominant. Member States have to respect the legal and economic
constraints of integration whether they act unilaterally or under the umbrella
of OMC guidelines (Scharpf 2002:655) . The OMC does not provide a suf-
ficiently strong ‘balancing test’ that compensate economic policy consider-
ations with social protection. However, one different way to look at the
question is to argue that economic and legal constraints provide a culture of
economic stability within which welfare states can be calibrated in different
ways. Scharpf seems to make the assumption that deficit spending, taxes
on capital, short-term demand management, the use of public utilities for
regional policy are the most important resources of the welfare state, and
seems to disregard supply-side policies as ‘neo-liberal economics’. But
there are other ways to produce social protection, and they are compatible
with competitiveness as master discourse. Ferrera, Hemerijck and Rhodes
(2001b) provide a systematic account of how one can approach this issue.
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8.3 Whither legitimacy for the OMC?
The legitimacy of the OMC is still contested. New modes of
governance based on soft-law raise the issue of the rule of law
and how Courts should handle processes such as the OMC
(Scott and Trubek 2002). Further, participation of local actors,
regional governments, social actors, and parliaments is limited.
This creates a problem of legitimacy and – as argued above – a
problem of effectiveness. So far the OMC has not been very
‘open’. The core of the OMC is a network of civil servants and
experts. This may increase the technocratic nature of the EU
policy process, rather than opening up pathways for more de-
mocratic decisions. In cases where the OMC managed to in-
volve trade unions, the business community, and social actors,
this is more the result of domestic practice than of the changes
brought about by the method. It seems that the potential of the
OMC in terms of changing the opportunity structure for par-
ticipation has not been fulfilled, perhaps with the exception of
social inclusion. 
To be clear on the democratic content of the OMC: there is
nothing (or very little) in the current practice that resembles
participatory democratic governance, democratic experimen-
talism based on bottom-up learning, or directly-deliberative
polyarchy17. This empirical statement stands in contrast with the
official political rhetoric trumpeting the virtues of the method.
It is also at odds with the optimistic – yet abstract – assessments
provided by academics interested in the potential of the open
method. The democratic components or real-world OMC
are weak in terms of participation, domestic salience of the
process (as shown by media coverage and political interest),
transparency of the discussions (only dedicated researchers
have an idea of how indicators were chosen and agreed),
communicative rationality, and democratic deliberation. 
17 As defined, inter alia, by Gerstenberg and Sabel (2002), Cohen and Sabel
(2003). See also Eberlein and Kerwer (2002) on democratic experiment-
alism in the European Union.
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This does not exclude a priori that the method may enhance
learning and deliberation at the level of bureaucrats, politicians,
and experts. This type of technocratic deliberation, however, has
nothing to do with democracy. The empirical evidence reviewed
in this report shows limited learning so far. But this should not
be underestimated. Preliminary and limited evidence on cog-
nitive convergence sheds light on how the method may assist the
re-orientation of policy-makers’ beliefs and their convergence
around ‘EU paradigms’. This is technocratic and political de-
liberation, not democracy.
As mentioned, in employment policy, the German paradigm has
been re-oriented in a direction consistent with the emergent be-
liefs at the OMC table. In tax policy, convergence around the
paradigm of fair tax competition is slow and problematic, but
progress in this direction cannot be denied. However, this
achievement is also the product of other forces at work, such
as the presence of proposals for directives, the pressure on
domestic policy-makers coming from state aid policy directed
at fiscal regimes, and the intensification of the OECD campaign
against harmful tax competition. The lesson here is that future
research should contextualise the OMC. Otherwise the risk of
pre-judging the role of the method looms large. Too much re-
search has been done on the method in vitro, too little on the
OMC in the context of other modes of governance (both new
and old) applied to the same policy area.
To conclude, the whole question of legitimacy and account-
ability is the biggest Damocles’ sword hanging over the open
method. Although there is some preliminary evidence of limi-
ted- technocratic-political learning, the potential in terms of
participation, openness, real transparency, increasing visibility
in the domestic media and parliaments – in a word, the demo-
cratic aspects of the process – has not been fulfilled.
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Instead of ‘the’ open method, one should talk of different
methods at work in a large number of policy areas. The fact that
official documents refer to the OMC even in areas where there
has been almost no progress in terms of methodologies consis-
tent with the Lisbon template suggests that the insistence on ‘the’
method is deliberate. Indeed, the OMC has now become a legiti-
mising discourse. It provides a community of policy-makers with
a common vocabulary and a legitimising project – to make
Europe the most competitive knowledge society in the world.
Academics have shed a very positive light on the OMC as new
mode of governance. This enhances the role of the open method
as legitimising discourse. The result is that policy practices that
up until a few years ago would have been simply labelled ‘soft
law’, declarations, voluntary codes, and benchmarking exercises
have now been adroitly ‘framed’ as ‘applications of the method’.
The OMC is not just an invention, however. There are structural
reasons for the appearance of the method in the EU policy pro-
cess, most notably the long-term attempt of European
policy-makers to get to grips with the problem of competitive-
ness. An implication is that the OMC is embedded in the master
discourse of competitiveness. The latter defines the perimeter
of what is politically feasible in terms of the ‘European social
model’. The legal and economic constraints of integration limit
the role of EU social and employment policy in any case,
whether member states are acting alone or in the context of the
open method (Scharpf 2002). 
One should not see the constrained nature of the OMC in pure-
ly negative terms, however. The master discourse of com-
petitiveness and legal-economic constraints are there to provide
a culture of macro-economic stability within which a whole
range of supply-side social-employment policies are still
feasible18. The master discourse limits the use of deficit
18 Moreover, the strongest constraints on the welfare state have nothing
to do with economic-legal integration, but with demography and domestic
institutional choices (Ferrera, Hemerijck, Rhodes 2001b).
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spending, types of state aid and forms of public procurement
that distort competition, ‘cultural’ policy used as a barrier to
trade, and rent-seeking behaviour in the shadow of public
monopolies of the utilities. It is not clear whether these policies
really produce welfare and social protection: most social scien-
tists would answer negatively. The advocates of ‘Social Europe’
should think more about the integration of employment and
social protection with the logic of competitiveness and less
about how to limit, ‘balance’, or revert this logic.
It is possible to detect an ideal-type of the method. In its ideal-
typical form, the OMC is a new mode of governance. This is due
to the main features of the method, such as participation, the ap-
proach to problem-solving, the ways in which knowledge and
learning are created and diffused within networks of political,
bureaucratic, and social actors. In its ideal-typical format, open
coordination has considerable potential: it can deliver ‘better
governance’. In this sense, it is not a second-best option to hard
legislation. It is a better way forward. The lack of hard sanctions
is not a problem in a governance architecture based on incen-
tives for learning.
Open coordination contains elements of endemic tension, how-
ever. On the one hand, its aim is to de-couple issues and to mute
politics. On the other, it should promote convergence and coor-
dination at the highest political level, such as the Spring Coun-
cil. It encourages cooperation and imitation, but it also promotes
diversity and competition. It is a means to achieve competitiv-
eness, but some advocates of ‘the European social model’ see it
as a way to balance economic logic with the logic of solidarity
and protection19.
Our review of the OMC across policy areas has shed light on
elements of similarity. The devil is in the details, as ever. Bench-
marking, peer-review, and learning mean different things in
innovation policy and employment policies. Most OMC pro-
19 Actually, the argument among those advocates is that the OMC is not
enough to provide such a balance.
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cesses are political, but innovation policy takes place at the
level of DG enterprise and stakeholders, with politicians so far
relatively at bay. The ideal-typical sequence of ‘guidelines-
indicators-national plans-evaluation’ structures the European
Employment Strategy, but in pension policy national strategy
reports have appeared in the absence of agreed indicators.
Taxation has no national plans, but selective and thorough
reviews of specific tax legislation. By contrast, reviews in
pension policy are quite light and much less evaluative. 
Assessing real-world open coordinaton is not an easy task. Only
preliminary and incomplete evidence is available. With this
qualification in mind, this report has addressed the questions of
learning, effectiveness, and legitimacy. On learning, the real-
world applications of the method have not generated consider-
able amounts of trans-national and across-levels learning. There
is evidence of learning in the sense of cognitive convergence.
This may become extremely important in the future, if cognitive
convergence goes as far as to alleviate the endemic tension of the
OMC – for example, by creating convergence at the level of
beliefs on what ‘the European social model’ should be. This
report has argued that the poor results in terms of learning
reflect the lack of bottom-up participation, the under-estimation
of the peculiarities of learning in a political context, and the
problems of producing usable knowledge via benchmarking.
Turning to effectiveness, the method has not achieved much in
terms of coordination across policies. Recent proposals should
improve on the status quo, by relating the Employment Strategy
to the BEPG and by giving the Spring Council the opportunity
to coordinate the whole Lisbon strategy – with the exceptions
of social inclusion pensions. The question remains whether the
European Council is the most appropriate body to cater for
policy coordination.
In specific policy areas, so far the main results of the OMC as
discourse has been to gain momentum for previously neglected
or politically sensitive policy initiatives. As mentioned, there is
also evidence of results in terms of ideational convergence.
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Whether this will lead to convergence in decisions and actions
is a moot point. Be that as it may, our knowledge of Europ-
eanisation suggests that the impact of the OMC will be dif-
ferentiated across countries and will depend on factors such as
the domestic opportunity structure and socialisation effects20.
Overall, the results achieved fall short of the grandiose expec-
tations launched at Lisbon. But the potential of open coordina-
tion is still there, ready to be exploited.
This leads to the question of how to make better use of
the method. One argument in this report is that a number of
claims about the OMC are exaggerated. Therefore, the future
discussion should be more realistic about how far the OMC can
go in achieving the goals set at Lisbon. It would be useful to cast
the discussion in terms of a realistic diagnosis of the instruments
and methodologies policy by policy.
One problem in the current debate is that open coordination has
been examined in vitro instead that in context. More research
on the empirical aspects of the method and on the relationships
between the method and other forms of governance (old and
new) is needed. One should have a clear idea of when and how
the OMC should be used, when other new modes of governance
should be used, or when the ‘old’ Community method is the
most appropriate approach. Most crucially perhaps, one should
have criteria to understand and assess the performance of
different modes of governance interacting within the same
policy areas21. Most policies reviewed in this report show
that the OMC is used in conjunction with other modes, but we
do not know much about the overall policy coherence achieved.
The choice to introduce one new mode has been often
haphazard and dictated by short-term political opportunities.
20 Socialisation may turn ‘local’ domestic policy-makers into ‘cosmopoli-
tans’ who fell some sense of belonging to a common European elite. This
socialisation effect would certainly enhance the impact of peer pressure on
domestic policy choices.
21 For example, self-regulation or co-regulation. Knill and Lenschow (2003)
have sought to analyse open coordination in relation to other modes of regu-
lation.
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An important implication of the ‘contextualisation’ of open
coordination is that the end result of proposed reforms should
not be how to improve the OMC but how to improve policies by
making European and domestic institutions more intelligent.
This suggestion is not limited to research on the OMC but, more
broadly and more importantly, to how policy-makers approach
the method. This is where the current emphasis on the OMC as
legitimising discourse is dangerous because it encapsulates
open coordination in a world of its own.
One way to relate the OMC debate to whole question of EU
governance is the proposal – which cropped up in different
working groups of the European Convention, such as the ones
on ‘Economic governance’, ‘Simplification’, and above all
‘Social Europe’ – to insert a treaty article defining the OMC.
The final report of the working group of Economic Governance
(European Convention 2002:6) argues that ‘there is a large
measure of support within the group for including, for the sake
of clarity, the basic objectives, procedures, and limits of the
open coordination method, where the European Parliament and
the European Commission should also have a role to play, in the
Constitutional treaty, but in a manner which does not undermine
the flexibility of the method’. The group on ‘Social Europe’
(European Convention 2003a) suggests a treaty provision in the
chapter on the instruments which constitute non-legislative
measures. This horizontal provision22.- the final report of the
Social Europe working group continues – should specify ‘that
the method can be applied only where no Union legislative com-
petence is enshrined in the Treaty and in areas other than those
where the coordination of national policies is governed by a
special provision of the Treaty defining such coordination (in
economic matters, article 99 and in the area of employment
article 128 in particular)’ (European Convention 2003a:18).
The ‘Social Europe’ working group sought to resolve the
tension between the logic of competitiveness and the logic of
22 For specific proposals, see Vandenbrouke (2002; 2003).
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solidarity by proposing that article 3 of the future Constitutional
Treaty include a reference to the promotion of full employment,
social inclusion, a high degree of social protection,efficient and
high quality social services of general interests, and, most con-
troversially, a ‘social market economy’ (European Convention
2003a:12). Another idea aired by this working group was to
state explicitly that no specific policy should be subordinate to
another, with reference to the status of employment policy in
relation to the BEPG. The current wording of art.128(2) is that
the Employment Guidelines should be ‘consistent’ with the
BEPG. The ‘Social Europe’ group was unable to make a recom-
mendation on this matter, as some members were in favour of
the current wording, whereas others wanted the ‘non-subordina-
tion’ principle explicitly inserted in the treaty. It seems that even
the group in charge of the definition of ‘social Europe’ did not
find enough consensus for an explicit balancing test between
employment and macro-economic goals.
Where do we stand now? The draft text of art.3 circulated by the
Praesidium of the Convention (European Convention 2003b)
does not contain references to the ‘social market economy’; it
contains a reference to the ‘free single market’, instead. How-
ever, the draft treaty clarifies that the Union ‘aims’ at full
employment and ‘balanced economic growth and social justice’.
The Union also ‘encourages’ ‘solidarity between generations and
between states’. The choices of the verbs ‘to aim’ and ‘to en-
courage’ illustrates the cautious approach of the Praesidium.
Turning to the specific areas in which the OMC should or
should not be applied, our review of policies shows that the rela-
tion between open coordination and legislative competence is
flexible and experimental. Flexible, because the OMC is used
in areas where there is legislative competence of the EU, but
also in areas of Member States’ competence and in ‘supporting
measures’ – a point duly acknowledged by the Complementary
Competencies working group in its final report. Experimental
because the OMC can be used to forge consensus on topics to
be later addressed by directives, a sort of first step in the jungle
of political complexity. But it may well be that the OMC reveals
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more potential than hard legal commitments and therefore there
is no need to advance towards hard law – if the experiment with
open coordination produces better results.
Flexibility and the ‘experimental nature’ of open coordination
suggest that a possible Constitutional article on the OMC should
not limit its application to areas where the EU has no legislative
competence. A more generic definition of open coordination
seems more appropriate, with the following qualifications:
• The article – a generic OMC provision – should simply define
open coordination and its process, not the results ; there is no
need to create a ‘rigid’ OMC. The process would not contain
instruments that are used only in some areas, such as the re-
commendations, but should include transparency, participa-
tion (as general features of the whole process), joint objec-
tives, the formulation of guidelines and indicators, country re-
ports, peer review of national plans, monitoring and feedback.
Consultation of the European Parliament should be a fund-
amental part of the process, although one has to appreciate
that the BEPG do not contemplate this.
• This leads to the next point. The generic provision on the
OMC should not apply to employment policy and economic
coordination, where there are already specific treaty articles.
• It may be useful to state that the acquis is in any case ‘pro-
tected’ by possible degradation via open coordination.
But reforms should go beyond treaty revisions. An inter-institu-
tional agreement clarifying the role of the Committee of the Re-
gions is needed. The institutional agreement could also streng-
then the constitutional provision of consultation of the European
Parliament suggested above. So far the method has been mana-
ged by the Council and the Commission without real involve-
ment of other EU institutional actors. There is also a need to cla-
rify the relationship between the OMC and the rule of law. This
is an old question for scholars of soft law, but so far the way
courts have looked into new modes of governance has been dis-
appointing (Scott and Trubek 2002). 
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One task for the next inter-governmental conference is to work
on the tensions behind the OMC. On the one hand, work in this
direction will be influenced by the political constellations of
governments in 2004. But on the other, the IGC should draw on
the positive and negative lessons arising out of what has been
attempted (and sometimes achieved, sometimes missed) in the
various policy processes in which new modes of governance
operate. The IGC has the opportunity to add clarification of the
meaning, constraints and expectations surrounding ‘the Euro-
pean social model’ and its role within the Lisbon agenda. Sug-
gestions have been made – such as the idea of enhancing the
social protection logic of the OMC with framework directives
or the proposal to insert a ‘balancing test’ provision in the
treaties (Vandenbrouke 2002; Scharpf 2002). This test should
create an obligation to look at costs and benefits both in terms
of economic integration and in relation to social protection.
Arguably, the most effective reforms are those at the level of po-
licies. The room for improvement here is impressive. There is
much to learn from intelligent benchmarking and how to draw
lessons from positive and negative experience. Up until now, the
adoption of benchmarking has been too a-critical and eminent-
ly influenced by experiences in the private sector. Benchmar-
king needs to be re-defined, and used in relation to other instru-
ments for trans-national and across-levels learning (see Lund-
vall and Tomlinson 2002; Rose 2002; Radaelli 2004). Peer re-
view and reporting should become more incisive. The national
plans are provided by national governments, hence they tend to
be over-enthusiastic about the current situation. It is of course
essential that national plans are prepared by governments be-
cause this creates political commitment, but more independent
reporting would enhance both learning and participation.
In this vein, the method should be opened up to NGOs, social
partners, regions, and local authorities. This could also mean
additional reporting (and not just scrutiny) on specific areas
from these actors. One clear lesson from the current experience
is that to increase participation within the OMC requires a re-
orientation of policy processes at the domestic level. This is not
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something that can be decided in Brussels. The institutional
architects of the OMC have neglected the issue of how to create
a structure of incentives for participation at the local and
national levels. 
Participation is just one dimension of the whole issue of
accountability, democratisation, and legitimacy of new modes
of governance. The visibility of the OMC in the media is rather
low – without an attentive public the method can be captured by
technocrats and vested interests. Democracy goes much further
than deliberation in technocratic circles. The democratisation of
the method is an extremely complicated exercise. It boils down
to an attempt to change domestic policy practice and policy
styles. Accountability is not ensured by the fact that the OMC
choices are taken by national leaders. Instead of launching yet
another discussion on the abstract properties of new modes of
governance it would be more useful to take stock of the nega-
tive lessons and re-think about democracy pragmatically. The
OMC has considerable potential for ‘better EU governance’ but
the effort to exploit this potential has just begun.
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